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Recent economic theory suggests that large firms invest in building their own
R&D facilities because there are significant problems associated with con-
tracting for new technological developments in the market. In the first place,
the uncertainties associated with valuing technological information are suffi-
ciently great that even ifsuch knowledge could be "displayed on a shelf," sell-
ers would have difficulty pricing it and buyers would have trouble deciding
whether to purchase it. Technological information is unlikely to be displayed
in this manner, however, because sellers are concerned not to reveal too much
about their discoveries. As a result, trade in technological information is diffi-
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cult to conduct. Firms may hesitate to purchase new technologies without full
information about how they work, but inventors may balk at providing this
level of detail for fear of losing control of their intellectual property. At the
same time, scholars argue, there are informational advantages to be gained
from moving R&D in house. Many innovations are stimulated by knowledge
gained in production and marketing activities. This kind of knowledge is
largely firm-specific. It can be readily communicated through interactions
among personnel responsible for different functions within a firm, but it is
much less easily transmitted across organizational boundaries. According to
this view, then, in-house R&D laboratories triumphed over nlarket exchanges
oftechnology because they made superior use ofinformation generated within
the firm and minimized the transaction costs associated with increasingly com-
plex and expensive forms oftechnological change (Teece 1988; Mowery 1983,
1995; Zeckhauser 1996; Arrow 1962).
In this essay, we offer an alternative view based on our assessment of the
information and contracting problems that firms actually faced at the time they
began to build their R&D capabilities. In particular, we argue that scholars
have overemphasized the information problems associated with contracting for
new technological developments in the market. Contrary to what one might
expect from the literature, the data show that an extensive trade in new techno-
logical ideas did develop over the course of the nineteenth century, supported
by the patent system and by the emergence ofinformation channels and inter-
mediaries that facilitated the sale ofpatents at arm's length.
The growth of this market for technology had important implications, we
suggest, for the extent to which invention was integrated with development.
Early inventors, ofcourse, typically engaged in both sets ofactivities-either
commercializing their ideas themselves or joining with outside investors to
form enterprises to exploit their patents. This combination of activities cer-
tainly continued and, indeed, even thrived where the growth of the market
made it easier to gain financial backing. But the expansion oftrade in technol-
ogy also made possible a new division oflabor, as inventors increasingly took
advantage ofthe greater returns to specialization that accompanied this growth
and focused their energies and resources on invention itself. Firms in turn re-
sponded to the expansion ofthis trade by developing capabilities that enabled
them to learn about and assess externally generated inventions. In an environ-
ment where many inventions were protected by patents and where this kind of
property right was vigorously enforced, maintaining one's competitive position
often meant purchasing (or at least contracting for the right to use) patented
technology. Indeed, a wrong decision about the value of a patent could mean
that a competitor gained control ofvital technology.'
1. As Steven Usselman's essay (chap. 2 in this volume) shows, well-organized industries like
railroads sometimes formed patent pools to lower the risks of making wrong decisions and to
prevent technological blackmail.21 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, firms devoted a
considerable part oftheir energies and resources to keeping on top oftechno-
logical ideas originating outside their bounds. This strategy was particularly
important for firms in the "high-tech" industries of the time-industries like
electricity and telecommunications, where technologies were complex and un-
dergoing rapid change. A& time went on, however, firms in these industries
increasingly turned their attention to developing their own internal inventive
capabilities. The reasons for this shift are beyond the scope of this essay, but
they include such developments as the rising cost ofthe human and physical
capital required for invention (which made it difficult for inventors to continue
to operate independently) and the emergence of large firms with significant
market power (which made patents an increasingly important factor in oligop-
olistic competition).
What we can and do argue in this essay, however, is that the shift was un-
likely to have been driven by firms' desire to take advantage ofthe lower trans-
action costs associated with in-house R&D compared to market purchases of
technology. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there al-
ready existed a well-functioning market for invention. By contrast, when firms
decided to invest in internal R&D facilities, they faced significant new infor-
mation and contracting problems-problems that scholars have failed to ap-
preciate. In order, for example, to reap the fruits that might be derived from
bringing inventors within the enterprise, firms had to learn how to manage
creative individuals so as to elicit their loyalty and enhance their productivity.
Entrepreneurially oriented inventors initially moved in and out ofemployment
positions and, even worse from the standpoint of firms, often tried to exploit
personally inventions that they devised on company time. Before firms could
capture the gains from their investments in R&D, therefore, they had to learn
how to tighten up their contractual relations with employee inventors and how
to convince such personnel that advancement within the enterprise was an at-
tractive alternative to self-employment. These were not easy lessons to master.
It took twenty or thirty years just for firms to work out standard employment
contracts giving them property rights to inventions developed in theirfacilities;
other problems associated with managing creative people were never com-
pletely resolved. Hence where recent scholarship has emphasized the difficul-
ties of contracting for technology in the market and the relative ease of inte-
grating invention and production within the firm, we reverse the story. During
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a well-functioning
market for invention, but significant organizational learning had to occur be-
fore firms could productively focus on in-house R&D.
1.1 The Patent System and the Market for Technology
The patent system provided the institutional framework within which trade
in technology evolved over the course of the nineteenth century. Consciously22 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
designed with the aim ofencouraging inventive activity-andthus technologi-
cal progress-the U.S. system provided the first and true inventor of a device
with an exclusive property right for a fixed term of years. One important fea-
ture of the law was that inventors had to be individual men or women; firms
could not receive patents directly for ideas developed in their shops. These in-
dividual inventors then had the option ofexploiting their property rights them-
selves, or they could sell (assign) or lease (license) them to others, whether
individuals or firms. Of course, inventors' ability to find buyers or licensees
for their patents depended on the security of these property rights. From the
beginning, responsibility for enforcing patent rights was left to the federal
courts, and as Zorina Khan has shown, judges quickly evolved an effective set
ofprinciples for protecting the rights ofpatentees and ofthose who purchased
or licensed patented technologies. As a result, not only did thousands ofinven-
tors pay rather substantial fees to obtain patents, butlarge numbers ofiridividu-
als and firms paid even greater amounts to purchase or license patent rights
(Khan 1995).
Although one purpose of the patent system was to stimulate invention by
granting creative individuals secure rights to their intellectual property, another
was to promote the diffusion of technological knowledge. The law required
all patentees to provide the Patent Office with detailed specifications for their
inventions (including, where appropriate, working models), and the result was
a central storehouse ofinformation that was open to all. Anyone couldjourney
to Washington and research others' inventions in the Patent Office files. In
addition, more convenient means of tapping this rich source of information
soon developed. The Patent Office itself published an annual list of patents
issued, and private journals, many ofthem issued by the leading patent agen-
cies of the day, emerged by the middle of the nineteenth century to improve
upon this service. One of the most important was Scientific American, pub-
lished by Munn and Company, the largest patent agency ofthe nineteenth cen-
tury. Others included the AmericanArtisan, published by Brown, Coombs and
Company; the American Inventor, by the American Patent Agency; and the
Patent Right Gazette, by the United States Patent Right Association (which,
despite its name, functioned as a general patent agency). Aimed at national
readerships, these journals featured articles about major technological im-
provements, printed complete lists of patents issued sometimes on a weekly
basis, and offered to provide readers with copies of full patent specifications
for a small fee. They also included a variety of advertisements that dissemin-
ated information about inventions (or how to profit from them), placed by pat-
ent agents and lawyers soliciting clients, detective-agencies specializing in pat-
ent issues, inventors seeking partners with capital to invest, patent holders
hoping to sell or license rights to their technologies, and producers ofpatented
products trying to increase their sales. Over time, moreover, specialized trade
journals also emerged in industry after industry to keep producers informed23 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
about patents of interest. The Journal ofthe Society ofGlass Technology, for
example, provided detailed descriptions of all patents taken out in the United
States and Britain that were relevant to the manufacture ofglass.
As individuals, patent agents and lawyers also became important channels
through which people and firms far from Washington could exploit the infor-
mation in Patent Office files. Their numbers began to mushroom in the 1840s,
first in the vicinity ofWashington and then in other urban centers, especially
in the Northeast. By the mid-1880s, there were about 550 such agents regis-
tered to practice before the Patent Office, with almost a quarter located in the
District ofColumbia, slightly more than half in New England and the Middle
Atlantic states, another fifth in the Midwest, and the rest scattered among a
few southern and western locations. Solicitors in different cities linked them-
selves in chains ofcorrespondent relations (similar to those that characterized
the banking system at the same time), thereby providing their local clients with
access to agents in Washington and information on patenting activity across
the country.
2
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that all these channels of
information made possible by the patent system worked effectively to diffuse
technological knowledge. Inventors scanned patent lists in search of develop-
ments in their fields and subscribed to periodicals relevant to their interests.
For example, Elias E. Reis reported that, when he read in the Official Gazette
ofthe United States Patent Office in 1886 about a patent issued to Elihu Thom-
son for a method of electrical welding, there "immediately opened up to my
mind a field of new applications to which I saw I could apply my system of
producing heat in large quantities." 3 Charles H. Roth, an inventor of bicycle
tires, subscribed to two papers, Bicycling World and Bearings, in order to keep
abreast oftechnological developments related to cycling. He also "read other
papers at the bicycle stores and at the Crescent Wheel Club Rooms, ofwhich
club I was a member."4 To give a different kind of example, the journals of
Wright, Brown, Quinby and May, patent solicitors, were filled with notations
of payments received from clients for searches of Patent Office records. For
instance, when the officers ofthe Waltham Watch Company decided to explore
the possibility of producing self-winding clocks and watches, they asked
Wright, Brown, Quinby and May to conduct a search for them so they could
2. The growth and geographic spread of patent agents and solicitors can be followed through
city directories and through the U.S. Patent Office's Roster ofRegistered Attorneys Entitled to
Practice before the United States Patent Office. For insight into the correspondent relations of
these agents, see Wright, Brown, Quinby & May Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch Company,
1854-1929, MSS 598, case 2, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration.
3. See "Record ofElias E. Reis," 8, Thomson v. Reis, case 13,971, box 1,845, Interference Case
Files, 1836-1905, Records ofthe Patent Office, Record Group 241, National Archives.
4. "Record of Roth," 6, Roth v. Brown & Stillman, case 17,930, box 2,488, Interference Case
Files, 1836-1905.24 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
learn about techniques already in use and reduce the risk ofbeing sued for in-
fringement.5
Even more interesting for our purposes, these various ~hannels ofinforma-
tion were also used by patentees to market their inventions. Advice manuals
recommended that, "ifthe inventor can afford it, it is well to have the invention
illustrated and described in one or more ofthe scientific and mechanical publi-
cations ofthe day." This announcement might then, ifnecessary (and the man-
uals claimed that further advertisement often would not be necessary), "be fol-
lowed up by ordinary advertising...in the paperorpapers which are designed
to meet the eye of the class or classes ofpersons to whom the invention is of
special interest." Advertisements in trade papers in tum might be followed by
personal solicitations to potential buyers, whose names could be obtained from
"men in New York and other large cities, who make it their business to furnish,
for a reasonable consideration, full and complete lists of all parties engaged
in any particular trade, occupation, profession, or manufacture throughout the
country" (Simonds 1871, 19, 24-26).
Patentees who did not feel able or willing to devote so much oftheir time to
marketing their inventions could turn to intermediaries for assistance. Virtually
any businessman could perform this function, as records ofpatents offered for
sale to important firms show.
6 But it was common for patent solicitors and
agents to play the role of middleman. Although the original function of these
specialists was to shepherd applications for patents through the official review
process and (in the case of the lawyers) to defend previously issued patents
in interference and infringement proceedings, as time went on they acquired
additional functions and often began to serve as intermediaries in the sale of
technology. There appears to have been some disagreement among solicitors
about whether such activity was proper, but many moved in this direction, ad-
vertising their willingness to sell patents on commission.
7 Some solicitors, in
5. The example is from a letter from the Waltham Watch Company to Wright, Brown, Quinby &
May, 25 January 1915, Wright, Brown, Quinby & May Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch
Company, 1854-1929, case 2. For numerous other instances, see Journal 1, Wright, Brown,
Quinby & May, 1881-1950, MSS 831, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School ofBusiness Ad-
ministration.
6. For example, the Nicholson File Company was offered the opportunity to buy a patent for a
rasp by a manufacturer ofengine governors who had acquired it for resale. Similarly, intermediar-
ies with main businesses as diverse as textile manufacturing and engineering consulting submitted
inventions for sale to AT&T. See correspondence between the Nicholson File Company and
Stillman B. Allen, 1873-75, Patent Records from Trunk, Nicholson File Co., MSS 587, Rhode
Island Historical Society Manuscript Collections; and T. D. Lockwood, Reports ofInventions (Not
Approved), 1904-8, box 1383, AT&T Corporate Archives.
7. H. W. Boardman and Company (1869, 13), solicitors of American and European patents,
stated unequivocally that the firm rigidly adhered to a rule "never to take contingent interests in
applications for Patents, nor to negotiate sales ofPatent rights, or become the owners in whole or
in part of them. We deem all such to be deviations from that rigid professional course necessary
to insure the strictest honor and integrity toward a client." Simonds (1871, 7-9) took a similar
position, advising patentees to sell their inventions themselves and not be seduced by the promises
ofsuch agents. See also Hutchinson and Criswell (1899, 161-62); Cresee (1907, 41-43).25 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
fact, became known for this service, and inventors would seek them out to find
buyers for their patents. For example, a party with an interest in a "Patent
SelfOiler" for railroad cars wrote an agent named Lemuel Jenks to solicit his
assistance in marketing their device: "We intend to sell it to one person for the
six New England States and I therefore wish you would give me your opinion
in that matter: to viz what price you think we should ask; what would we have
to pay you for your assistance in carrying and effecting a sale." 8 The records of
important concerns such as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) contain numerous letters from inventors offering their own patents for
sale, but also a nearly equivalent number ofapproaches from patent agents and
solicitors marketing inventions on behalfoftheir patentee clients.9
1.2 A Quantitative Picture of the Market
The extent to which the market for patented technology was already well
established by 1870, especially in the northeastern regions ofthe country, can
be seen from table 1.1, which reports descriptive statistics for a sample ofas-
signment contracts.
lO In order for the sale of a patent to be legally binding, a
copy ofthe contract had to be deposited with the Patent Office in Washington.
These contracts are now stored at the National Archives, and our sample con-
sists ofall the approximately 4,600 contracts filed during the months ofJanu-
ary 1871, January 1891, and January 1911. Although the numberofassignment
contracts increased dramatically over this period, more than doubling between
1871 and 1911, the number ofpatents filed increased even more rapidly. As a
result, the ratio of assignments in our sample to the total number of patents
issued actually peaked by the beginning ofour period, declining from 0.83 in
1870-71 to 0.71 in 1890-91 and 1910-11. 11
The high volume by 1870 ofcontracts relative to patents is a strong indica-
tion that trade in rights to patented technology was already well developed.
In addition, the high proportion early on of what we are calling "geographic
assignments"-thatis, sales ofpatent rights that were restricted to some (often
distant) subregion of the United States-suggests that a significant amount
of arm's-length trading was already occurring by midcentury. Although the
8. Letterof30April 1870 from Aug. H. Fick (lastname not completely legible) to Jenks, Lemuel
Jenks, 1844-1879, MSS 867, box 3, folder 59, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School ofBusi-
ness Administration.
9. See T. D. Lockwood, Reports ofInventions (Not Approved), 1904-8.
10. In this paper we focus on national aggregates. In other work (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff
1996) we deal with the issue ofwhy the market for technology did not develop uniformly across
the nation.
11. It is important to note that these ratios are not measures of the proportion of patents that
were ever assigned, which we cannot calculate, but instead are estimates ofthe volume ofassign-
ment activity relative to patenting activity. One cannot infer from the fall in these ratios that the
proportion ofpatents ever assigned also declined after 1870-71. The drop over time in the propor-
tion ofsecondary and geographic assignments might have reduced the estimated ratios, even ifthe




Assignment to patenting index 115.1 109.5 132.4
% assigned after issue 70.4 31.2 30.1
% secondary assignments 26.6 14.8 12.0
% geographic assignments 17.1 0.8 0.0
Middle Atlantic
Assignment to patenting index 100.7 94.8 116.3
% assigned after issue 70.9 44.4 37.9
% secondary assignments 33.3 16.4 11.0
% geographic assignments 19.1 1.9 0.7
East North Central
Assignment to patenting index 96.3 118.1 104.9
% assigned after issue 77.7 48.5 32.8
% secondary assignments 18.1 18.4 11.8
% geographic assignments 34.3 5.7 1.8
West North Central
Assignment to patenting index 90.7 110.1 73.5
% assigned after issue 77.4 48.6 42.6
% secondary assignments 32.3 19.2 11.0
% geographic assignments 41.9 13.0 2.6
South
Assignment to patenting index 60.0 68.9 68.0
% assigned after issue 74.4 42.3 48.2
% secondary assignments 27.9 11.3 19.1
% geographic assignments 20.9 6.2 2.5
West
Assignment to patenting index 150.0 67.2 81.5
% assigned after issue 59.1 57.4 36.0
% secondary assignments 22.7 11.4 10.4
% geographic assignments 18.2 7.4 1.2
Total domestic
Assignment to patenting index 100.0 100.0 100.0
% assigned after issue 72.3 44.1 36.5
% secondary assignments 27.8 16.4 12.0
% geographic assignments 22.8 4.6 1.2
Assignments to patents ratio 0.83 0.71 0.71
Number ofcontracts 794 1,373 1,869
Source: Our sample consists of all assignment contracts filed with the Patent Office during the
months ofJanuary 1871, January 1891, and January 1911. These contracts are recorded in "Liber"
volumes stored at the National Archives.
Notes: There are a total of about 4,600 contracts in our sample. Only those involving assignors
that resided in the United States are included in this table. TIle assignment-to-patenting index is
based on the ratio of assignments originating in the respective regions (given by the residence of
the assignor) to the number ofpatents filed from that region in 1870, 1890, and 1910 respectively.
In each year the index has been set so that the national average equals 100. The percentage of
secondary assignments refers to the proportion ofassignments where the assignor was neither the
patentee nor a relative ofthe patentee. The percentage ofgeographic patent assignments refers to
the proportion of assignments where the right transferred was for a geographic unit smaller than
the nation.27 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
proportion ofgeographic assignments dropped dramatically between 1870-71
and 1910-11, this change did not mean that market trade in technology was
falling off. Rather the decline should be seen as a consequence ofthe growth
of national product markets. Once manufacturers in a single location could
retail their products nationally, it made less sense to try to sell geographically
exclusive rights to producers in different parts ofthe country. Producers were
now more interested in purchasing full national rights that would give them a
competitive edge over rivals elsewhere. 12
Two related changes are also apparent in the table. In 1870-71, secondary
assignments-thatis, sales ofpatents where the assigner was neither the paten-
tee nor a relative ofthe patentee-accounted for more than a quarter of total
sales. By 1910-11, the figure had fallen to 12 percent. In other words, there
was less reselling ofpatents as time went on; an increasingly large proportion
of sales were being made directly by the patentee. 13 More important, the pro-
portion of assignments that occurred after the date the patent was issued
dropped from 72.3 percent ofthe total in 1870-71 to 36.5 percent in 1910-11.
That is, as time went on patentees were able to sell their inventions earlier and
earlier-often before their patents were actually issued. 14
For the subset of inventions assigned at or before the date the patent was
issued, we can get a more precise sense of the magnitude and direction of
change over time. Table 1.2 is based on three random cross-sectional samples
ofpatents drawn from the Annual Report ofthe Commissioner ofPatents for
the years 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11. These documents report for all
patents issued during the year the names ofthe patentees as well as the names
ofany assignees who were granted property rights to the patents at the time of
12. In addition, the marketing ofgeographic assignments had always posed information prob-
lems that could be avoided once it became possible to dispose ofnational rights in one fell swoop.
For example, the relationship between inventors and the itinerant agents who sometimes marketed
their patents in other parts ofthe country was open to opportunism and even outright fraud, and
disreputable agents were accused of a variety ofcrimes-from misrepresenting the value ofpat-
ents, to collecting commissions on bogus sales, to embezzling funds rightfully due inventors. Fur-
ther, contemporary writers claimed that patentees who disposed of their rights piecemeal risked
the possibility that familiarity with the device would stimulate some other inventor to patent a
substitute or an improvement that would reduce the value ofthe original patent and therefore the
proceeds from later sales. For this reason they advised inventors to dispose of a patent in its en-
tirety "as soon as possible after its issue" (Simonds 1871, 28-29; An Experienced and Successful
Inventor 1901, 58-59; Cresee 1907, 26-27, 61).
13. Although assignment contracts had to be filed with the Patent Office in order to be legally
binding, there was no similar legal requirement to file licensing agreements. Our sampleofassign-
ment contracts does contain some licensing agreements, but they are very few in number, and
anecdotal evidence suggests that those recorded in this manner were a declining proportion ofthe
total of such agreements over time. It is likely, therefore, that the decrease in secondary assign-
ments was more than compensated for by an increase in licenses, and that our figures understate
this important (and growing) dimension ofthe market for patented technology.
14. At least part of the rise in the fraction of assignments that occurred before issue resulted
from an increase in the length oftime consumed by the application process. In order to get a rough
idea of the extent ofthe increase, we compared two samples of 125 patents each drawn from the
October 1874 and October 1911 issues of the Official Gazette ofthe United States Patent Office.
In 1874, the median time between application and issue was 4 months and the mean 5.8 months.
In 1911, the median was 12 months and the mean 18.2 months.28 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff










% ofassignments to group including patentee
% ofassignments in which patentee assigned
away all rights to unrelated individuals
% ofassignments in which patentee assigned
away all rights to a company
% ofassignments in which patentee assigned
away all rights to a company with the same
name as the patentee
% ofpatents in which patentee maintained
stake (did not assign or assigned to group
including patentee or assigned to company









Sources: The table is based on three random cross-sectional samples of patents drawn from the
AnnualReportofthe Commissioner ofPatents for the years 1870-71, 1890-91, 1910-11.
Notes: The three samples total slightly under 6,600 patents, including those granted to foreigners.
The table includes only patents awarded to residents of the United States. The category "% of
assignments to group including patentee" consists ofpatents assigned to one or more individuals
including the patentee, an individual with the same family name as the patentee, or an individual
specifically designated as an agent for the patentee. Patents assigned to companies with the same
last name as the patentee were included in the general category ofpatents assigned to companies,
as well as in the particular category of companies with the same name as the patentee. It is, of
course, also possible that patentees had an ownership stake in companies that did not bear their
name.
issue. Table 1.2 reports the frequency with which patents in these samples were
assigned at issue, as well as the frequency of various types of assignments,
including the proportion that went to companies. The table also provides a
summary measure of the extent to which patentees retained a stake in their
inventions-that is, the total numberofpatents not assigned at the time ofissue
plus the numberofthose assigned that went to groups including the patentee or
to companies with the same name as the patentee.
When combined with the information from table 1.1, the figures in table 1.2
suggest a progression over time. Initially, inventors not only came up with new
technological ideas but also developed and commercialized them, sometimes
by starting their own businesses, sometimes by selling partial rights to their
ideas to producers in different geographic markets, and sometimes by doing
both. As the market for technology expanded and matured, inventors seem to
have employed it to facilitate these kinds of business activities. For example,
during the early 1870sassignments at issue typically involved the sale ofshares
of patent rights to groups of individuals who were not coinventors, but who
generally resided in the vicinity ofthe patentee, and it is likely that these partial
assignments compensated local partners for advances ofcapital to support the








Distribution ofPatents by Patentee Commitment to
Patenting, 1790-1930
Number of"Career" Patents by Patentee (%)
1 2 3 4-5 6-9 10+
Patent Pqtents Patents Patents Patents Patents
51.0 19.0 12.0 7.6 7.0 3.5
57.5 17.4 7.1 7.6 5.5 4.9
57.4 16.5 8.1 8.0 5.6 4.4
21.1 12.5 9.9 15.8 11.8 28.9
19.5 10.3 10.3 10.3 13.8 35.9
33.2 14.3 8.2 9.8 9.4 25.0
Sources: The figures from 1790 to 1842 are from Sokoloff and Khan 1990, 363-78. The figures
for the later years were computed from a longitudinal data set constructed by selecting all the
patentees in the cross-sectional samples (see table 1.2 for a description) whose family names began
with the letter B and collecting information on the patents they received during the twenty-five
years before and after they appeared in the samples. This data contains information of6,057 pat-
ents granted to the 561 B inventors.
second pattern emerged as patentees increasingly relinquished all property
rights to their inventions by the time ofissue, assigning their rights in particular
to companies. The shift can be seen as a drop in the proportion of patents in
which the patentee retained a direct stake-from 92.2 percent in 1870-71 to
79.7 percent in 1910-11. Because many of the patents not assigned at issue
were probably of limited economic value, however, the change can be seen
more clearly in the fall in the proportion of assignments that went to groups
that included the patentee-from 52.1 percent in 1870-71 to 25.4 percent in
1910-11.15
The growth oftrade in patented technologies was accompanied by dramatic
increases in the degree to which patentees specialized in inventive activity. This
development is reflected in table 1.3, which presents estimates ofhow the share
of patents awarded to inventors with long-term commitments to patenting
changed over the course of the nineteenth century. We obtained the estimates
for 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11 by selecting from our three cross-sec-
tional samples inventors whose last names began with the letter B and collect-
ing information on all the patents these inventors received in the twenty-five
years before and after they appeared in the respective sample. We then grouped
the inventors according to the total number of patents they obtained over the
fifty-year period and calculated how all the patents in each cross-section were
distributed across these groups. Finally, we compared our results with data on
career patenting for the period 1790-1842 compiled by Kenneth Sokoloffand
Zorina Khan (1990).
The figures indicate a major shift, with the proportion ofpatents awarded to
15. As we will show below, however, a significant proportion ofthe assignments to companies
involved firms in which the patentees were officers.30 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 1.4 Average Number ofPatentsAwarded to Various Types of
Patentees, 1870-1911
Year total ofpatents for all patentees
Year total ofpatents for patentees who did not assign
Year total ofpatents for patentees who assigned
Year total ofpatents for patentees who assigned to a
group including themselves
Year total ofpatents for patentees who assigned away
all their rights to unrelated individuals
Year total ofpatents for patentees who assigned away
all their rights to companies
Year total ofpatents for patentees who assigned away















































Sources: The table is based on three cross-sectional samples drawn from the AnnualReportofthe
Commissioner ofPatents for the years 1870-71, 1890-91, 1910-11.
Notes: For each patent in the sample, we counted all ofthe other patents received by that patentee
in the same year. For additional information on these samples and on the definitions ofthe catego-
ries, see table 1.2. The number ofsample observations for each cell is reported within parentheses.
individuals who received ten or more patents over their careers increasing from
below 5 percent in the three early cross-sections to 25 percent or more in the
three cross-sections between 1870 and 1911. The early 1800s were a relatively
democratic era ofinvention, when a broad segment ofthe population was ac-
quainted with the basic elements ofthe technology in use, and the typical in-
ventor filed only one or two patents over his or her lifetime. The rapid expan-
sion of the market for patents that occurred during the second third of the
nineteenth century made it easier to extract returns from technological discov-
eries by selling off patent rights, and seems to have coincided with the emer-
gence ofa class ofinventors who were relatively specialized at inventive activ-
ity. Occasional inventors, whose efforts at technological creativity were only
one aspect oftheir work, continued to be significant contributors to technologi-
cal change, but their share ofpatents fell sharply. From over 70 percent as late
as the 1830s, the share ofpatents accounted for by individuals with only one
or two career patents declined to less than 35 percent by the 1870s.
Another, perhaps more direct, indication ofthe relationship between special-
ization at invention and the practice of selling off patent rights is the higher
productivity of patentees who assigned to companies. In table 1.4, we report
for our three cross-sectional samples from 1870-71, 1890-91, and 1910-11
the average number ofpatents received by individual patentees in a single year,
grouped by whether the patentee had assigned away his or her rights (and to31 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
whom) before the date of issue of the patent. As is clear, patentees who as-
signed their patents at issue were more productive (in terms ofthe number of
patents they received in a given year) than those who did not assign. Moreover,
inventors who assigned their full patent rights to unrelated individuals or to
companies were more productive than those who retained a share oftheir pat-
ents. The patentees who consistently received the most patents per year were
those who assigned at issue to companies, and it is interesting to note that the
relatively small but growing number ofpatentees who assigned away all rights
to companies that bore their last name were by 1890-91 the most productive
ofall.
1.3 Inventors and Firms
Both the growing tendency of inventors to assign all rights to their patents
at issue to companies and the greater productivity at invention of patentees
who disposed oftheir patents in this way, raise questions about the identity of
these inventors and the nature oftheirrelationship with the companies to which
they assigned. There are three main possibilities: first, that the inventors were
independentagents who sold theirpatents in arm's-length transactions; second,
that they were principals (for example, officers or proprietors) ofthe firms to
which they assigned; and third, that they were employees of their assignees.
These three possibilities have different implications for the extent to which
invention was integrated with development. The first case, ofcourse, implies a
clear division of labor between those who invented and those who developed
the inventions commercially. The second case is more ambiguous, because we
cannot tell from this kind of information alone whether the patentees formed
companies in order to integrate invention with commercial development or
whether they were seeking to provide themselves with a better vehicle to sup-
port their specialization in inventive activity. The third case is the one most
favorable to those who would argue for an increased integration of invention
and development within large firms. However, to the extent that inventors who
assigned to their employers obtained more patents than those who did not, the
difference may not have resulted from efficiency gains deriving from integra-
tion, but instead from inventors' greater ability to specialize within large-scale
enterprises or from cost savings derived from economies of scale in carrying
out invention or in filing patent applications.
Unfortunately, because assignments ofpatents typically take the same con-
tractual form whether they involve arm's-length sales, grants of patent rights
by principals to their associated firms, orthe acquisition by firms ofemployees'
inventions, it is difficult to get a sense ofthe relative importance ofthese differ-
ent kinds of transactions over time. We have, however, devised a number of
alternative ways to approach the problem. Although these alternatives are in-
dividually partial and imperfect, collectively they allow us to conclude with
reasonable confidence that the acquisition by firms of employees' inventions32 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 1.5 Relative Numbers ofPatents Assigned after and at Issue to
Individuals and Companies
After Issue At Issue
No. % No. % Total
1871
To individuals 454 73.2 166 26.8 620
To companies 112 68.3 52 31.7 164
Total 566 72.2 218 27.8 784
1891
To individuals 370 45.6 441 54.4 811
To companies 230 41.8 320 58.2 550
Total 600 44.1 761 55.9 1,361
1911
To individuals 307 40.4 453 59.6 760
To companies 369 33.6 728 66.4 1,097
Total 676 36.4 1,181 63.6 1,857
Source: For a description ofthe sample, see table 1.1.
cannot account either for the general trend in assignments in favor of compa-
nies or the greater productivity at invention of patentees who assigned away
their patent rights.
Our first, and least direct, approach is based on the assumption that assign-
ments that occurred in the.context ofthe employment relationship were more
likely to occur at the time the patent was issued for the simple reason that, in
such cases, the company commonly assumed responsibility for patenting the
invention, paying all the necessary fees and providing legal counsel, in ex-
change for an immediate assignment. Table 1.5 (which is based on the January
1871, 1891, and 1911 samples of assignment contracts) shows that there was
nothing remarkable about the propensity ofcompanies to obtain assignments
at issue. Although the proportion ofassignments to companies that took place
before issue always exceeded that ofassignments to individuals, the difference
was relatively small and showed only a slight tendency to widen over time.
More important, the proportion ofassignments that occurred at issue increased
dramatically over time for both types ofassignees, suggesting that the change
resulted more from improvements in the general market for technology than
from the movement ofinventors within firms. 16
A second approach uses the longitudinal data on our B patentees to explore
the extent to which there were stable, ongoing relationships between patentees
and assignees. In table 1.6, we present, for different classes of patentees, a
measure ofthe degree of"contractual mobility," where contractual mobility is
defined as the number of different assignees over time to which a patentee
16. Once again, however, it is important to note that the time interval between application for a





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.34 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
transferred patent rights at issue. The upper panel reports the distribution for
the individual B patentees, broken down by the total number of patents re-
ceived over their careers and by the number of different assignees to which
they transferred patent rights. The lower panel reports the analogous distribu-
tion for all ofthe patents received by the B patentees. This distribution is equiv-
alent to a weighted version of the distribution in the upper panel, where the
weights are the numbers ofpatents received by the patentees over their careers.
As the figures in table 1.6 indicate, the most highly productive patentees
(those with twenty or more career patents) were not generally tied to single
assignees. Only 12 percent ofthe patentees in this class relied on one assignee
throughout their careers. By contrast, 44 percent contracted with four or more
different assignees over time. (The analogous figures for the number ofpatents
associated with this group were 12.2 and 48.9 percent respectively.) These re-
sults make it difficult to believe that stable employment relationships were
responsible for the high productivity at patenting we observe among inventors
who assigned away their patent rights. Ifthese inventors were in fact employ-
ees, then they were employees who often either moved restlessly from job to
job or who, despite their positions, behaved entrepreneurially and assigned
their patents to buyers other than their employers. This conclusion appears
even stronger when one recognizes that the percentages in the table pertain
only to patents that were actually assigned at issue. The highly productive pat-
entees in this group chose to retain control at issue ofthe rights to more than
40 percent ofthe patents they received, reserving for themselves the ability to
sell or license their inventions in the future. It is likely that ifwe had informa-
tion on subsequent assignments or licensing agreements, our estimates of the
extent ofcontractual mobility would only increase.
In order to get a more direct understanding ofthe relationship between pat-
entees and their assignees, we traced the inventors in our B sample through city
directories and, wherever possible, recorded their occupations and/or places of
employment for the years in which they were issued patents.
17 The resulting
subset is certainly not representative ofthe general population ofpatentees. In
the first place, it is more urban. I8 In the second, it is biased in favor of those
who were more occupationally settled and therefore more likely to be picked
up in the directories. As a consequence of this bias in favor of stability, one
17. For this exercise we used an earlier version ofthe longitudinal B sample that included data
on most but not all of the fifty years surrounding each patentee's appearance in a cross-sectional
sample. The effect ofusing the incomplete sample was to reduce the average number ofassignees
per patentee and thus to increase the likelihood offinding apparently stable relationships between
patentees and assignees. Although the period oftime for which we have data ranged from 1843 to
1935, 96 percent ofthe observations fell between 1867 and 1930.
18. Patentees in the subsample came from more than fifty cities, but more than 50 percent of
the observations in eachofour three subperiods came from the same six cities (Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia). One potential problem: the post-1910 sub-
sample is very different from the others in the limited representation of New York and the large
fraction ofobservations from Chicago (over 30 percent).35 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
might expect that assignments made to companies by patentees in long-term
employment relationships would be more prominent in this subset ofthe data
than in the B sample as a whole.
19 As we will show, however, employees who
assigned their patents to their companies still played only a minor role.
In table 1.7, we summarize the information collected for this subsample of
urban patentees by presenting for each ofthree time periods descriptive statis-
tics on the distribution of patentees (based on one randomly selected patent
per patentee) and on the distribution of all their patents. The distributions are
broken down in the upper panel ofthe table by occupational class and, in the
bottom panel, by type ofrelationship between patentee and assignee. Caution
in generalizing from this data is warranted because the subsample is clearly
not representative of the entire population of patentees and because we were
not able to determine the employment status of all ofthe inventors. Neverthe-
less, the results strongly suggest that, until well into the twentieth century,
when inventors transferred the rights to their patented technologies to others,
their assignees were unlikely to be their employers. The proportion ofpaten-
tees in the subsample who were employees averaged only 28 percent over the
entire period, and the fraction ofpatents they accounted for was even less (20.7
percent on average). Moreover, the share ofassignments at issue made by em-
ployees to employers hovered around the modest level of 10 percent.20
Although the relatively small role played by employee patentees was an en-
during feature ofthis era, several major changes in the market for technology
are evident in the patterns of assignments at issue. First, as we have already
documented using other data sets, patentees became increasingly likely over
time to assign away all rights to their patents at the time ofissue. This trend is
reflected in table 1.7 in the sharp decline in the fraction ofpatents not assigned
at issue (from 75.1 percent before 1890 to 29.7 percent after 1910). Second,
there was also a significant increase over time in the proportion of patents
transferred at issue to assignees who had a formal association with the paten-
tee-thatis, to patentees' employers orto firms in which patentees were princi-
pals orofficers. This total rose from a mere 6.6 percentofpatents before 1890,
when arm's-length exchanges were more common, to 43.6 percent after 1910.
Virtually all ofthe increase resulted from the dramatic growth both in the pro-
portion ofpatents accounted for by principals and officers in firms and in the
tendency of such individuals to assign their patents to their companies. The
share of patents awarded to principals and officers rose steadily from 37.2
19. Comparison ofthe patenting and assignment data for individuals from the B sample whom
we could locate in city directories with similar information for individuals whom we could not
suggests that such a bias is probably present.
20. Because there is a significant group of patent assignments for which we were unable to
determine the association (or lackthereof) between the patentee and the assignee, the actual figures
for assignments by employees to employers were likely somewhat higher. However, the qualitative
result that patentees assigning to their employers did not account for a large share of the assign-
ments of patented technologies seems firm. The bias owing to measurement error would almost
certainly be offset by that attributable to our relying here on assignments at issue.Table 1.7 Occupations ofPatentees and Relationships to Assignees as Indicated by
City Directories
Before 1890- After All
1890 1910 1910 Years
Occupations
Principals and officers of % ofpatentees 20.6 33.9 40.4 30.8
firms % ofpatents 37.2 46.5 60.5 49.0
Employees % ofpatentees 20.6 36.9 19.2 28.0
% ofpatents 18.1 25.9 17.3 20.7
Unknown or independent 0/0 ofpatentees 58.8 29.2 40.4 43.2
% ofpatents 44.7 27.6 22.2 30.3
Total No. ofpatentees 68 65 52 185
No. ofpatents 454 641 603 1,698
Relationship between patentee
and assignee
No assignment % ofpatentees 77.9 53.9 51.9 62.2
% ofpatents 75.1 49.0 29.7 49.1
Patentee to employer % ofpatentees 1.5 6.2 5.8 4.3
% ofpatents 2.0 8.9 6.6 6.2
Patentee is principal or % ofpatentees 2.9 9.2 13.5 8.1
officer in assignee firm % ofpatents 4.6 19.2 37.0 21.6
Patentee and assignee are % ofpatentees 0.0 4.6 0.0 1.6
related by name % ofpatents 1.3 1.4 0.5 1.1
Unknown relation 0/0 ofpatentees 5.9 10.8 23.1 12.4
% ofpatents 7.5 7.2 21.1 12.2
Patentee has no relation % ofpatentees 11.8 15.4 5.8 11.4
to assignee % ofpatents 9.5 14.4 5.1 9.8
Notes: The data on which this table is based were constructed by searching the available city directories
for information on the occupation and place of work of the patentees in our B sample (described in the
note to table 1.3). This search was conducted on an earlier, incomplete version ofthe sample, which did
not include all ofthe career patents issued to each ofthe 561 patentees. The effort yielded information on
185 patentees, who were responsible for 1,698 patents according to our partial listing. The information
retrieved from the city directories was then used to classify each ofthe patentees we found, at the time of
each ofhis patents in our partial sample, by occupation and by relationship to the assignee ofthe patent
(if the patent was assigned at issue). Three occupational classes were defined. A patentee was classified
as a "principal" if listed in the respective directory as an officer of a firm (president, vice president,
treasurer, secretary, orgeneral manager), orwith an occupation that seemed to indicate proprietorship (for
example, manufacturer or inventor). A patentee was classified as an "employee" iflisted in the respective
directory with an occupation that suggested a subordinate position in a firm (for example, manager, super-
intendent, salesman, clerk, chiefengineer, or foreman). A patentee was classified in the "independent" or
"unknown" category if it was unclear from the occupation whether the individual was a principal or
employee (for example, agent, engineer, machinist, brewer, chemist, or printer), and if no firm was listed
as a place ofwork. As for the classification ofthe relationship between the patentee and the assignee, six
categories were defined, the first being those cases where the patent was not assigned at issue. An assign-
ment was classified as being from a patentee to an employer if the patentee was an employee and the
assignee had the same or a similar name as the firm listed as the p1ace of work. A patent assignment was
classified as from a principal to his firm ifthe patentee was a principal in the firm to which the patent was
assigned. An assignment was classified as one that involved no relationship between the patentee and the
assignee ifa place ofwork was listed that was different from the name ofthe assignee, or ifthe assignee
was an individual with a different surname. An assignment was classified as a case ofa patentee assigning
to a family member ifthe patentee and the assignee had the same surname. The classification "unknown
relation" was used when there was no report of a place of work and the patentee was classified in the
unknown or independent category. It was also used in miscellaneous cases where it was unclear whether
the patentee and assignee had a formal relationship.37 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
percent in the years before 1890 to 60.5 percent after 1910, and the fraction of
patents that were assigned to a firm in which the patentee was a principal or
officer increased from 4.6 percent before 1890 to 37 percent (more than half
of all assignments at issue) after 1910. The increased prominence in the sub-
sample of patentees who were principals and officers of firms was to some
degree paralleled by a decrease in the proportion ofpatentees who were inde-
pendent inventors. The difficulty of establishing that a patentee was an inde-
pendent inventor means that there is greater uncertainty about trends in this
category ofpatentees, but we know that the share ofpatents granted to paten-
tees ofindependent or unknown status declined from 44.7 percent before 1890
to 22.2 percent after 1910. One possible explanation for these parallel patterns
may have been an increase in the propensity ofindependent inventors to incor-
porate their enterprises (perhaps as an aid in raising capital). Ifthis was indeed
the case, then part ofthe growth in the proportion ofpatents issued to princi-
pals and officers offirms (as well as in the proportion ofassignments at issue
that wentfrom such individuals to theircompanies) may have owed to achange
in industrial organization rather than to a decrease in the extent of arm's-
length transactions.
21
We continue to explore changes over time in the pattern ofassignments with
the help oftable 1.8, which reports the same distributions ofpatents and paten-
tees as table 1.7, but now broken down first by categories of association and
then by occupational class and time period. As is apparent from the lower per-
centages ofpatents not assigned in the distribution ofpatents compared to that
ofpatentees, inventors who assigned their patents at issue received more pat-
ents on average than those who did not, across all occupational classes and
time periods. Although the difference is not very large in the independent or
unknown class during the two earlier subperiods, the result suggests that the
higher productivity of patentees who assigned their patents at issue is not an
artifact generated by a particular occupational group or type of patentee/as-
signee relationship. The secular trend toward higher rates ofassignment at is-
sue was likewise not specific to a single occupational class; nor did it result
from a change in the occupational composition ofpatentees.
The advantage of the distributions presented in table 1.8 is that they allow
us to explore trends in assignment behavior within each occupational class.
Once again, the most important changes were the growing share of patents
awarded to patentees who were principals or officers in firms and the increas-
ing propensity ofpatentees in this group to assign to the companies with which
they were associated. Although the employee category was the occupational
21. Two developments were probably at work here. The first was a general shift in the preferred
form oforganization for small firms away from proprietorships and partnerships to corporations.
The second was a concomitant shift in the propensity to assign patent rights to the firm. The
peculiarities of partnership law and the short time horizon of most firms that were organized as
partnerships may have discouraged inventors from assigning their patents to their companies. Cor-
porations, on the other hand, may have found it difficult to raise share capital unless the firm































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.39 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
class with the highest rates of assignment at issue, the estimates in table 1.8
provide further support for the idea that the transfer of patent rights by this
group of patentees to their employers was not the major force behind the rise
in assignment rates. Not only was the proportion ofpatents registered to em-
ployees relatively constant over time at a modest level, but when employees
sold their patents, they appear to have been more inclined than principals and
officers to assign to parties with whom they had no formal association. This
inclination decreased over time. By our estimates, half or more ofthe patents
(depending on the weighting scheme) assigned by employee patentees before
1890 went to parties other than the employer, with this percentage dropping
into the 15 to 20 percent range after 1910. Nevertheless, given that the share
of patentees we can identify as employees had by then shrunk below 20 per-
cent, and that employee inventors still had relatively low rates of assignment
to parties with whom they had formal associations, it is clear that the behavior
ofthis group was not accounting for the aggregate patterns.
The evidence we obtained by tracing patentees through city directories thus
leads to several generalizations about the evolution of patent assignments in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. First, assignments were ex-
tensive and growing in overall volume and, at least until late in the nineteenth
century, seem to have most often involved arm's-length transactions. Second,
all groups ofpatentees increased the proportion ofpatents they assigned over
time and exhibited an empirical association at the individual level between
rates ofassignment and productivity at patenting. Third, a major change in the
patterns ofassignment began to be apparent between 1890 and 1910, and was
even more pronounced afterward. Patentees who were principals and officers
or employees became more inclined to assign their patents to the firms with
which they were associated, and the relative share of principals and officers
among the population ofpatentees grew substantially. Moreover, inventors who
were principals or officers in the firms to which they assigned were the most
prolific patentees of any group.22 Whether they were like the classic inventors
who commercially exploited their inventions themselves (through firms that
integrated invention with development and other general business activities)
or whether they had organized firms that were specialized at generating new
technologies remains unclear. Further research is required to determine
whether this structural break reflects a renewed emphasis on integrating inven-
tion with other business activities or an extension to the level of firms of the
trend toward division of labor between those concerned with invention and
those concerned with commercial exploitation.23
22. Here again we should remind the readerthat the greaterdifficulty oflocating mobile individ-
uals in city directories may have resulted in an overrepresentation of patentees who had stable
long-term relationships with firms. However, the problem should have affected our proportions of
employees as well as ofprincipals and officers in firms.
23. It should be noted that Thomas P. Hughes (1989) has argued that this period was the golden
age ofthe independent inventor. Our work could be interpreted as providing a quantitative basis
for his assertion.40 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 1.9 Distribution ofAssigned Patents by the Number ofAssignments
Received by the Assignee in the Year
1 2-3 4-5 6-10 >10
Assignment Assignments Assignments Assignments Assignments
1870 63.4% 19.9% 5.4% 2.6% 8.7%
(795) (250) (68) (32) (109)
1891 54.8% 23.5% 8.1% 8.3% 5.3%
(2,097) (898) (310) (316) (203)
1911 41.5% 19.0% 7.3% 6.5% 25.7%
(2,536) (1,160) (446) (396) (1,572)
Sources: These estimates of the distribution of assigned patents were calculated from a data set
constructed by collecting the number of assignments received by the assignee in the respective
year for all patent assignments appearing on every other page oftheAnnualReportofthe Commis-
sioner ofPatents for 1870, 1891, and 1911 (assignees, like patentees, were listed in alphabetical
order).
Notes: Because we ran over to the off pages in order to get a complete accounting of all the
patent assignments received by the assignees sampled, our procedure is likely to overstate the
concentration ofpatent assignments across assignees. Numbers ofobservations are in parentheses.
Finally, the results ofouranalysis ofthis urban subset ofpatentees is consis-
tent with the notion that trade in the rights to patented technologies involved
broad segments ofthe industrial sector and that the growing proportion ofpat-
ents that were assigned to companies did not simply result from employees
in the R&D departments of large firms transferring their inventions to their
companies. Further evidence for this view is provided by table 1.9, which re-
ports evidence on the frequency distribution ofassignments among samples of
assignees drawn from the Annual Report ofthe Commissioner ofPatents for
the years 1870, 1891, and 1911. These results, which were calculated in such
a way as to provide upwardly biased estimates ofthe degree ofconcentration,
suggest that the assignment of patents was extremely unconcentrated during
the first two ofthese years, though much less so by the third. Over 60 percent
ofpatent assignments in 1870 went to assignees who received only one assign-
ment in that year, and more than 80 percent went to those with three or less.24
In 1891 the proportion ofthose with three or less assignments was still nearly
80 percent. By 1911, however, the figure had dropped close to 60 percent, and
there is evidence ofa substantial shift toward greater concentration. In particu-
lar, the increase in the proportion of assignments to firms with more than ten
assignments from under 10 percent in 1870 and 1891 to over 25 percent in
1911 (when General Electric alone received over 300 patent assignments) is an
indication that the character and organization oftrade in patented technologies
had begun to change during the intervening years.
24. In 1870, the fraction that went to assignees that received more than ten assignments was 8.7
percent, a rather modest proportion but one that would have been even lower (below 3 percent) if
it had not been for one outlier, the Erwin Russell Manufacturing Company in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts. This company, which produced doors, door knobs, and related products, had nearly
!hirty patents (over halfofwhich were design patents) assigned to it in 1870 by a single patentee.41 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
1.4 Firms and the Market for Technology
We can get a better idea ofwhat was accounting for this shift by looking at
the behavior ofthe firms themselves. The case ofthe American Bell Telephone
Company, one ofthe "high-tech" enterprises ofthe period, offers an instructive
example. Bell's patent department issued annual reports detailing the number
of patents it evaluated from both inside and outside sources. For example,
in 1894, it investigated seventy-three patents submitted "by the public" and
twelve brought to its attention by employees.25 The company filed patent appli-
cations for virtually all of its employees' inventions-not apparently because
the patent department found the ideas particularly valuable, but for morale
reasons and becausethe costofobtaining patents in this way was low (typically
the company paid bonuses of$50 to employees whose inventions it patented).26
The asking price for outside inventions was often thousands ofdollars, and the
department recommended against purchasing almost all of them. Conse-
quently, ifone were to divide the company's patents into two categories-those
purchased from outsiders and those that originated within the firm-the latter
would be numerically preponderant. Nonetheless, it is clear that, during this
early period, it was on the assessment ofoutside inventions that the department
spent most ofits energies and resources. Company records contain numerous
reports evaluating the novelty and importance ofinventions offered by the pub-
lic for sale. These reports were by no means pro forma; rather they included a
great deal of technical detail that was specific to the invention at hand. More-
over, the company seems to have devoted the same painstaking attention to the
messy, handwritten submissions of unknown inventors as it did to the more
polished presentations of high-priced patent solicitors.
27 It seems, in other
words, that the company was determined not to overlook any possible source
of technological advantage that might be obtained by purchasing the patents
of independent inventors, even though it found most of the inventions it re-
viewed not worth pursuing.
Indeed, documents extant in the company's records suggest that American
Bell attached much greater importance in its early years to assessing inventions
that originated in the external environment than it did to promoting inventive
25. It also investigated twenty-six inventions originating with employees of the local phone
companies to which American Bell licensed its technology (Annual Report ofthe Patent Depart-
ment, 1894,7,American Bell Telephone Co., box 1302, AT&T Corporate Archives).
26. As the director ofthe patent department, T. D. Lockwood, wrote in his 1894 annual report
(1-2), "So far as concerns the devices gotten up by our own employees ... , the practice of the
year has been, in a general way, to file an application for patent on nearly every device presented
for consideration; ... and to keep all questions of merit, and the presence, or extent ofinvention,
largely in the background." See also Lockwood's "Statements ofObjectives and Practices ofAT&T
Patent Department, 1877-1937," extracted in "Memorandum for Messrs. Root, Ballantine, Harlan,
Bushby & Palmer," 22 November 1949, 15, Divestiture Collection, location 451 01 01, folder 17,
AT&T Corporate Archives.
27. See T. D. Lockwood, Reports of Inventions (Not Approved), 1904-8. These evaluations
became especially important after 1894, when the patents that had given American Bell an effec-
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activity within the firm. The architectofthis policy was T. D. Lockwood, long-
time head ofthe company's patent department and a vigorous opponentofwhat
we would now call investment in R&D. As Lockwood wrote in an 1885 letter
to the company's general manager, "I am fully convinced that it has never, is
not now, and never will pay commercially, to keep an establishment ofprofes-
sional inventors, or of men whose chief business it is to invent; or a corps of
electricians who are assumed or expected as a part oftheir duty, to invent new
and valuable telephones or telephonic appliances, in their employ." 28 Lock-
wood's vision, as embodied in his summary later that same year of the duties
of the patent department (and in the department's actual practice), placed em-
phasis first and foremost on examining "patents or inventions submitted by the
public for consideration" and second on examining "descriptions ofinventions
forwarded by the company's employees." Only at the end ofthe report, seventh
in a list of miscellaneous duties appended after a lengthy discussion of the
department's library, did he include the responsibility for suggesting "special
and suitable lines of experimentation" within the firm. Much more important
in his mind was the duty to "receive copies of electrical patents from Patent
Office ... , bringing to the attention of the company, such as may commend
themselves for novel or striking features," "to constantly acquire information
upon all classes ofelectrical patents," and to maintain a well-stocked library. In
other words, Lockwood was mainly concerned with building American Bell's
capacity to learn about and assess the merits ofinventions generated elsewhere
in the economy. The central mission ofthe company's patent department, as he
saw it, was to collect information from a wide variety ofsources so as to main-
tain familiarity with (and be in a better position to evaluate) technological de-
velopments occurring throughout the economy. Not until Theodore N. Vail be-
came president in 1907 would the company shift resources to internal R&D.29
Bell's policy, as articulated by Lockwood, was extreme, but George Wise
28. The text of the letter is included in an 11 September 1952 memo by Lloyd Espenschied,
"Early Company Inventing-ARevealing Letter," Western Electric Collection, location 91 05 140,
folder 6, AT&T Corporate Archives. Lockwood was not completely consistent, however. He
brought Stephen D. Field into his department in 1897 after the company bought some of Field's
patents: "I engaged his services in 1897 or thereabouts, to make other inventions of the same
kind....Prior to that time he had been for a long time a sort ofguerilla inventor on his own hook"
(Testimony ofLockwood in Read v. Central Union Telephone Company, abstracted in "Memoran-
dum for Messrs. Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer;' 68).
29. T. D. Lockwood, "Duties ofPatent Department," 23 November 1885, AT&T Collection, box
1302, AT&T Corporate Archives. Lockwood's sense of his own duties was confirmed by Vail in
testimony given in 1908: "Mr. Lockwood's duties were, first to examine every patent that was
issued-I mean connected with the telephone or electricity-tp see whether it had any bearing on
our business, and if so we tried to get some rights under it and possession of it. Next he was to
examine all the devices in the carrying on ofthe business.... Ofcourse new devices in the new
business were all the time occurring to the people. Those were submitted to us from our licensees,
and Mr. Lockwood would examine them as to the patentability and as to the value, and whether
they had been gone over before, and all that sort ofthing" (extracted in "Memorandum for Messrs.
Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer," 30). On Vail's own support for internal R&D, see
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has argued that Westinghouse and Edison Electric/General Electric (two other
high-tech firms ofthe period) followed a similar strategy in the late nineteenth
century of "purchas[ing] patents and short-term consulting services from in-
dependent inventors" rather than developing their own R&D facilities (Wise
1985, 69-70). We have found much the same story for firms that used older
mechanical technologies as well. For example, Channing Whitakerbuilt up the
patent department and library at the Lowell Machine Shop, arguing that it was
essential to keep track of patents issued to outside inventors so that the com-
pany did not waste resources reinventing what had already been developed
elsewhere. He also argued that the purchase ofoutside patents should be con-
sidered "not a net expense, but a net saving" because it enabled managers to
solve technical problems more cheaply than they could if they relied ex-
clusively on internal resources.30 Two decades into the twentieth century, the
giant Standard Oil of New Jersey was still struggling to build up this kind of
general tracking capacity. As George S. Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton argued
in their study, The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927, the company had long shown
little interest in promoting R&D internally and had been lax as well in building
the capacity to assess and gain control oftechnological ideas originating in the
external environment. In 1918, E. M. Clark, the new general manager of the
company's Bayway refinery, began a campaign to improve the company's
knowledge ofoutside technologies. His first step was to arrange for its patent
work to be shifted to the Chicago firm ofDyrenforth, Lee, Chritton and Wiles,
patent solicitors, a firm that had a great deal ofexpertise in petroleum-refining
technology.31 He then, in consultation with FrankA. Howard, a member ofthis
firm, planned and promoted the creation within Standard of a development
department whose purpose was to collect information about and assess new
technologies originating outside the firm. According to Gibb and Knowlton,
the new department was founded on the principle that "new ideas and inven-
30. "How the Patent Library Came into Existence," box 1, file 8; "TheValue ofa Patent Depart-
ment to a Manufacturing Concern," box 2, file 17; both in Channing Whitaker Papers, Lambert
Collection, Center for Lowell History.
31. It was common for firms without their own capabilities for assessing externally generated
technology to achieve the same ends in a vertically disintegrated way by establishing a long-term
relationship with a firm ofpatent solicitors. TheWaltham Watch Company, for example, had such
a relationship with the firm of Wright, Brown, Quinby and May. The solicitors' detailed, highly
technical reports assessing the patentability of inventions (generated both inside and outside the
company) are evidence that they were providing technological as well as legal services. In addi-
tion, the firm performed a variety of other functions for its manufacturer client: it brought new
inventions to the attention of the company, compiled lists of all patents in force on particular
subjects, searched out inventors in other parts of the country, and negotiated assignments with
inventors both inside and outside the company. See, for example, Arthur H. Brown's 27 July 1912
report on the patentability of an instrument invented by George H. Lang and manufactured by the
Stover and Lang Speedometer Company. See also the 3 March, 30 March, and 6 May 1905 letters
from Wright, Brown, Quinby and May to the American Waltham Watch Company, and the 31
March 1913 letter from Olaf Ohlson, the 16 November 1914 letter from George T. May, Jr., and
the 25 January 1915 letter from the Waltham Watch Company to the solicitors (Wright, Brown,
Quinby & May Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch Company, 1854-1929, case 2).44 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
tions would arise in the main from external sources, and that [its] primary
job would be to uncover these ideas, test them out, and carry them forward
to some practical end.... [T]he new plan was not aimed at fostering creative
research." What Standard did, in essence, when it created this department was
to internalize the services ofits patent solicitors (Howard himself was brought
in as manager) so as to acquire capabilities (similar to those developed much
earlier at American Bell) for keeping abreast ofoutside inventions. Only in the
next decade would Standard make a serious effort to promote internal R&D
(Gibb and Knowlton 1956, 113-14, 122-23,522-25).32 Nor was Standard par-
ticularly slow in moving to this next level. Although a small number of large
firms-Du Pont is the prime example-built in-house R&D facilities before
World War I, Standard's experience was more typical.33
1.5 Inventors within Firms
The extensive efforts made by firms, including those in high-tech industries,
to gain information about and evaluate inventions originating outside their
bounds are strong evidence against the notion that information problems made
it difficult to contract for technology at arm's length. As we shall see, the ev-
idence suggests to the contrary that contracting problems were if anything
worse within the firm than without during this period of time. Indeed, it took
many firms quite a long while to work out employment relationships that en-
abled them to gain title to inventions developed in their shops and labs. Here,
however, American Bell was an exception on the progressive side. As early as
the 1880s, Bell required its employees to sign contracts giving it first right of
refusal on their inventions. Such contracts were relatively rare until the period
following World War I, and we have found only a few examples from the last
two decades ofthe nineteenth century. William R. Baker, a foreman at McCor-
mick Harvester, had this type ofemployment contract in the 1880s; so, in the
1890s, did William T. Smith, a foreman at William Knabe and Company's pi-
ano works.34 According to testimony by Lockwood in 1916, even within the
32. We are indebted to David Mowery for suggesting this reference. Despite Mowery's emphasis
on the difficulties ofcontracting for technology in the market, he recognized that one ofthe most
important functions ofearly R&D facilities was to assess externally generated inventions (Mow-
ery 1995).
33. For an overview ofthe development ofindustrial research in the United States, see Mowery
and Rosenberg (1989, 35-97). On Du Pont, see Hounshell and Smith (1988)..
34. "Record ofWilliam R. Baker;' 10, Baker v. Miller, case 9,957, box 1,402, Interference Case
Files, 1836-1905~ "Record in Behalf of William T. Smith," 20, Smith v. Perry v. Keidel, case
16,028, box 2,212, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905. The ~arliest example we have been able
to find ofsuch an employment agreement was the hiring ofmechanic Allan Pollock by the Boston
Manufacturing Company in 1820. However, the preoccupation ofChanning Whitaker (head ofthe
patent office at the Lowell Machine Shop during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)
with the problem of obtaining title to employees' patents suggests that the Boston Associates did
not continue to insist upon this condition ofemployment. See Gregory (1975, 156-57) and Whit-
aker's notes on court cases involving employee patent rights in box 7, file 4, Channing Whitaker
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telephone industry the practice was limited to a few firms: the New England,
Chicago, and Central Union telephone companies, in addition to American
Bell. New York Telephone did not have such an arrangement with its employ-
ees, and as a result, American Bell was able to purchase an invention patented
by one ofits men.35
Some employment contracts explicitly mentioned patents, but gave the em-
ploying firms the right only to use-not own-inventions devised by their
employees. For example, inventors in the employ ofthe Waltham Watch Com-
pany typically agreed only to grant the company an exclusive right to the use
oftheir patents during the term of their employment. When the company was
reorganized in 1907, it tried without much success to acquire property rights
to the patents it was using, but could do little more than ask its solicitors to
write polite notes inquiring whether the inventors would now be willing to
make assignments.36At least some key employees flatly refused to assign their
patents to the watch company. For example, the firm's general superintendent
responded that "he has an agreement with the Company, providing for the use
ofhis inventions, but that he does not expect to make formal assignments relat-
ing to them." 37
Inventors at many other firms had no contractual obligations whatsoever to
provide their technology to their employers and, indeed, felt little compunction
about exploiting their inventions themselves, even if they came up with the
ideas while working in their employers' shops. August Markert, who worked
as a carpenter for A. P. Lorillard and Company (a tobacco manufacturer),
35. Testimony ofT. D. Lockwood in Read v. Central Union Telephone Company, abstracted in
"Memorandum for Messrs. Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer," 69, 71. Even American
Bell was willing to acquiesce in the entrepreneurial independence of some of its employees. As
late as the 1930s, for example, AT&T (American Bell's successor) negotiated special agreements
with employees who preferred "to retain the license [themselves], especially for operating in fur-
ther than the telephone field" and with employees who claim their "rights are so valuable that they
should be paid more than a mere bonus." Similarly, at least in the early years the university scien-
tists it kept on retainer were not required to give the company "first call" on their inventions
(testimony ofG. E. Folk, General Patent Attorney, before the FCC, abstracted in the "Memoran-
dum," 125-26; testimony of T. D. Lockwood in Read v. Central Union Telephone Company, ab-
stracted in the "Memorandum;' 68).
36. Wright, Brown, Quinby & May to EzraC. Fitch, 29 January 1907, Wright, Brown, Quinby &
May Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch Company, 1854-1929, case 2. See also the letter from
the same parties to Edward A. March, 23 January 1907.
37. Wright, Brown, Quinby & May to Matthews, Thompson & Spring, 28 February 1907,
Wright, Brown, Quinby & May Correspondence Files, Waltham Watch Company, 1854-1929, case
2. Apparently, some ofthe Waltham Watch Company's contracts required employees to assign their
patents to the firm, but these agreements do not seem to have been well enforced. So much is clear
from a 1906 letter written by patent solicitors for the Waltham Watch Company to the widow of
one of the firm's employees: "You are doubtless aware that under an agreement entered into be-
tween your late husband and the American Waltham Watch Company, several patents now standing
in his name are to be assigned to the Company, the agreement providing that all his inventions
made during a period which has not yet expired, relating in any way to Watches or to the Manufac-
ture of Watches, shall be assigned to the Company. A large number of the patents have already
been assigned; but those that have been granted since 1896 have not yet been assigned" (Wright,
Brown, Quinby & May to Mrs. Duane H. Church, 24 January 1906).46 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
reasoned that the company had a right to his inventions when its managers
instructed him to work on a particular problem and told him how to go about
it, but that things were different "when I got it out ofmy own head." Markert
claimed that he had invented a device for tagging plug tobacco. When the fore-
man to whom he showed the machine attempted to take credit for the invention
and applied for a patent for the benefit ofthe company, Markert filed his own
application, triggering interference proceedings by the Patent Office.38Another
inventor, M. V. Smith, testified in an interference suit that he came up with an
idea for a new furnace while working as superintendent for the National Roll-
ing Mill Company in McKeesport, Pennsylvania: "I regarded it to my best
interest to keep the employees ofthe National Tube Works as much as possible
from knowing anything about my improvement on that furnace, and resigned
my position with said company, as superintendent, before I ordered the Patent
Office drawings made." 39 Two employees ofthe American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company invented a catcher for tinning machines, building the device on com-
pany time with company resources and testing it in the company's Gas City,
Indiana, plant. When the machine proved promising, they quit their jobs, rea-
soning that "if we ever got together again in an independent plant we would
have a better opportunity of obtaining suitable remuneration for the patent."
The two men subsequently accepted employment with the Carnahan Tin Plate
and Sheet Company, one ofAmerican's competitors. The Carnahan company
promised to bear the expense of patenting the machine in exchange for a li-
cense to use it, with the inventors retaining ownership of the patent.40 Even
high-tech firms ofthe period experienced similar problems. Westinghouse, for
example, hired William Stanley to develop a transformer, only to have him
claim that a new type of lighting he invented while working on the project
was his sole property. Similarly, the manager ofthe Edison Machine Works in
38. "Testimony on Behalf of Markert," 10, 12, Hieatt and Hearn v. Markert, case 8,290, box
2,854, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905. In an interference proceeding, the Patent Office held
a hearing to determine which ofthe conflicting patentees was the first and true inventor and should
be awarded the patent. The Patent Office's interference files contain numerous cases where applica-
tions for letters patent were filed both by an employee and his employer, with the former challeng-
ing the latter's claim to an invention developed while he worked for the firm. For example, S. T.
Schofield contested with H. C. Cragg over which of the two men actually invented a screw feed
mechanism developed while he was in the employ of the H. C. Cragg Manufacturing Company.
Elmer A. Sperry found himself tied up in an interference proceeding with a draftsman he had
formerly employed in his factory, and Charles A. Lindstrom had a similar experience with a drafts-
man he hired. See "Testimony on Behalfof S. T. Schofield," Cragg v. Schofield, case 25,592, PF
box 3,319, ROPO Interference Case Files, 1900-1925 (the ROPO Interference Case Files are still
under the control ofthe Patent Office but are stored at the National Archives and Record Center);
"Sperry's Record," 41-42, Sperry v. Eickemeyer v. Morgan, case, 16,498, box 2,269-72, and "Testi-
mony on BehalfofLindstrom," Lindstrom v. Larson, case 20,284/20,293, box 2,744, both in Inter-
ference Case Files, 1836-1905.
39. "Testimony in Chief of M. V. Smith in the Matter of the Interference of John Pedder vs.
Martin V. Smith," 25-26, Pedder v. Smith, case 9,448, box 3,077, Interference Case Files, 1836-
1905.
40. "Lewis & Williams Record," 4-8, Lewis and Williams v. Cronemeyer, case 24,270, PF box
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Schenectady, New York, complained to the company's lawyers in 1890 that
employees were obtaining patents but refusing to assign them to the firm.
41
It is important to note that firms' lax policies with respect to theiremployees'
inventions cannot simply be explained as a function of their belief that they
owned title to the patents as a matter ofcommon sense or common law. Inven-
tors hotly contested firms' assertions that they deserved such ownership rights,
and the courts typically backed inventors over their employers. Indeed, by the
tum ofthe century, it was well established that the mere fact ofan employment
relationship did notentitle a firm to an employee's inventions, even ifthe inven-
tion was developed at company expense. Ifthe inventor was hired for the spe-
cific purpose ofbuilding a particular machine or improving a particular prod-
uct, then the employer had a right to the invention (the reason being that the
employee had "onlyproducedthat which he was employed to invent. His inven-
tion [was] the precise subject ofthe contract ofemployment"). More generally,
however, the courts refused to hold that a contract ofemployment, "albeit [one
that] covers a field of labor and effort in the performance of which the em-
ployee conceived the invention," entitled the firm to an assignment ofthe pat-
ent.42This latterrule appliedeven to cases where a firm had employed someone
with technical skills "to take charge of its works, and to devote his time and
services to devising and making improvements in articles there manufactured."
As the majority ofthe Supreme Courtdecided in the 1893 caseAllen C. Dalzell
et al. v. Dueber Watch Case Manufacturing Company, "in the absence of an
express agreement" by which the employee promised to assign all his patents
to the firm, the company could not claim ownership of the patents.43 In other
words, by their very laxness in not requiring or enforcing such "express
agreements," firms jeopardized their rights to inventions developed in their
shops.
Firms, however, might still obtain a use right, or shop right, to these inven-
tions. As a principle of equity, the courts often granted firms a nonexclusive,
41. These last two examples are from Wise (1985, 70-72). By 1900, General Electric required
its employees to sign contracts promising to assign their inventions to the company. In the only
attempt at explaining this phenomenon that we have found in the literature, Wise argues that such
contracts were a "social invention" made possible by the growth of large, centrally controlled
firms. According to Wise, smaller firms "lacked the legal skills to write such a contract. And even
ifthey hired lawyers to do the writing, enforcing the contract might require too much ofthe time
of the owner and his few assistants." Although it is undoubtedly the case that the cost of such
contractual arrangements fell over time as both firms and employees gained experience with them,
it is unlikely that, even early on, these kinds ofexpenses were as prohibitive as Wise suggests. As
we saw above, moreover, small firms were among those pioneering in the use ofsuch contracts.
42. United States ofAmerica v. Dubilier Condenser Corporation, United States Supreme Court
Reports, 77 Lawyers' Edition 1114. This 1933 case contains an excellent summary ofthe case law.
See also 16 American Law Reports, Annotated (hereafter ALR) 1177; 32 ALR 1037; 44 ALR 593;
85 ALR 1512; 153 ALR 983; 61 ALR 2d 356; Prindle (1908, 84-102); Fisk (1997). Employees
could not, however, claim ownership ofinventions for which they had merely made suggestions
that did not amount "to a new method or arrangement which in itself is a complete invention"
(Johnson 1913,189).
43. United States Supreme Court Reports, 37 Lawyers' Edition 749.48 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
nontransferable license to use, without payment of royalty, inventions devel-
oped by their employees on company time with company resources.44 Even
here, however, the courts found iteasierto enforce the principle in the presence
of an express agreement with the employee, a circumstance that inspired at
least one firm (the Pullman Company) to rethink its employment contracts.
After learning about one such case in the fall of 1912, executives ofthe com-
pany began to worry that inventions developed by employees were being pat-
ented on the outside and that rights to these devices were being assigned or
licensed to the firm's competitors. The executives commenced an investigation
into the extent of the problem and, at the same time, began to formulate a
policy about inventions patented by employees. Interestingly, in the earliest
drafts ofthe policy, the company claimed no ownership rights to its employees'
inventions, seeking only to insure its legal "license to use devices on our own
cars without royalty." In these early drafts, the company even planned to pay
employee inventors half of any royalties it collected on cars constructed for
outside companies and acknowledged that "other outside arrangements" could
"be made direct by the inventor." 45 Only after several months and several drafts
had gone by did the company decide on a policy to require employees to "give
the Company preference in disposing of the title to such invention and the
patent therefor, in addition to the shop-right which the law implies." In ex-
change, the company offered to pay a bonus of $250 for any invention which
it decided should be patented.46 There is no evidence that the articulation of
this policy was accompanied by any new R&D initiatives; it was simply an
attempt to insure the company control ofinventions producedby its employees.
The final draft differed from the initial versions mainly in the company's deci-
sion to claim full property rights to employees' inventions and thus deny com-
petitors' access to this technology.47
The Pullman Company's attempt to gain control ofthe inventions ofits em-
ployees was part of a more general move to improve its ability to assess the
value ofnew technologies. The centerpiece ofthis policy was the creation ofa
new Committee on Standards in 1912. The committee consisted ofsenior man-
agers with considerable technical expertise, and was charged with evaluating
44. Key cases included the 1886 Charles H. Hapgood et al. v. Horace L. Hewitt, United States
Supreme Court Reports, 30 Lawyers' Edition 369, and the 1896 labez H. Gill v. United States, 40
Lawyers' Edition 480. For a summary of the case law, see United States ofAmerica v. Dubilier
Condenser Corporation; 61 ALR 2d 356.
45. See the minutes ofthe 22 October 1912 and 7 January 1913 meetings ofthe Committee on
Standards, Operating Department, Chief Engineer, Equipment Standards and Testing Records,
1889-1956, box 2, folder 4, Pullman Company Archives, Newberry Library.
46. "Policy and Procedure in Patent Matters," 21 November 1913, Secretary & Treasurer, Office
ofthe Secretary & Treasurer, box 1, folder 2, Pullman Company Archives.
47. The new policy was articulated in part as an effort to encourage improvements by employ-
ees, but this language was mainly an attempt to make more palatable what was really a radical and
unilateral change in the nature of the employment contract. The circumstances under which the
policy was formulated-and the bulkofthe document's provisions-makeit clearthat the purpose
ofthe policy was to impose restrictions on employees' behavior.49 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
the inventions of employees and deciding which ones were worth attempting
to patent. The committee was further charged with responsibility for deciding
which outside patents the company should purchase: "no letter recommend-
ing a particular invention should be written by an official in this Company
without the approval of the Committee on Standards."48 The committee had
additional duties (for example, testing the properties of inputs into the firm's
production process and setting and enforcing quality standards for its products)
but in other respects functioned much like the patent department that AT&T
had set up earlier. It was part ofthe process by which the firm learned to im-
prove its ability to tap new technologies, whether they were generated inside
the enterprise or out.
Although the evidence suggests that employment contracts giving a com-
pany ownership of its employees' inventions were not yet routine during the
first two decades ofthe twentieth century, by the 1930s such agreements appear
to have been commonplace. The Committee on Patents of the U.S. House of
Representatives held hearings in 1936 about proposed revisions to the patent
law. As part of its investigation, the committee sent inquiries to a number of
companies that included a question about employees' contractual obligation to
assign inventions to the firm. Fourteen of the responses (ranging from giant
enterprises such as Standard Oil and International Harvester to a number of
small aviation companies) were reprinted as appendixes to the hearings. In
almost all cases the firms reported that the great majority of the patents they
owned originated with their own employees who had contractual obligations
to assign their inventions to the company. There thus seems to have been a
pronounced shift toward reliance on internally generated technologies in the
period after the First World War.49
1.6 Learning by Firms
The sources ofthis shift are complex and involve developments, such as the
growth of oligopolistic competition, that are beyond the bounds of our re-
search. But the change can also to some extent be understood as the outcome
ofthe processes we have been describing. In the first place, as firms tightened
up their internal affairs, they were in a better position to exploit the inventive
talent already present in their organizations. In the second, the capabilities they
had built up to assess externally generated inventions could also be put to other
uses within the firm-could be employed, for example, to pinpoint fruitful
48. Policy and Procedure in Patent Matters, 8.
49. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Committee on Patents ... on H.R. 4523, a Bill
Providing for the Recording ofPatent Pooling Agreements and Contracts with the Commissioner
ofPatents (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1936), parts 2-4. The firms reporting
were Beech-Nut Packing, Curtis Aeroplane and Motor, Douglas Aircraft, Great Lakes Aircraft,
Hercules Powder, Ingersoll Rand, International Business Machines, International Harvester, North
American Aviation, Socony-Vacuum Oil, Standard Oil, Sun Oil Company, Western Union, and
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areas ofresearch in which the company might itself engage. Moreover, firms
that invested in such expertise had to invest as well in facilities to develop and
commercialize the inventions they purchased, facilities that could be turned
to the development of internally generated inventions and then expanded into
departments devoted more broadly to R&D. Indeed, this was the sequence of
events that occurred at Standard Oil.
Perhaps more important, as the complexity of technology increased by the
end ofthe nineteenth and especially by the early twentieth century, it became
more and more difficult for inventors to maintain their independence. Even
though the growth ofthe market for technology had made it easier for paten-
tees to sell offtheir property rights at an early date and to form corporations to
exploit their inventions, they still faced a great deal offinancial uncertainty-
especially in those sectors of the economy where the costs of invention, in
terms of both human and physical capital, were likely to be greatest. In the
electrical field, for example, Elias E. Reis was unable to patent (let alone de-
velop) all his inventions for exploiting the heat generated by electricalcurrents,
because even the preliminary expenses of building models and applying for
patents for all of them were too much for his backer to bear. Although Reis
"repeatedly" explained "that not only was their filing ofgreat importance, but
that unless we did so... the applications that have already been filed ... would
suffer very materially, and, perhaps, to an irretrievable extent," his patron
would not put up additional money until revenues from the earlier patents he
had financed began to materialize. "Had I the means available to enable me to
file some of these applications," Reis claimed, "I should certainly have done
so long since, but as matters stand, and have stood, I ... do not find myself at
liberty to seek the assistance ofothers." Desperate for funds, Reis had assigned
his backer rights to all his inventions in exchange for financial help. Support
ofthis kind was hard to get, Reis felt, and he was not willing to jeopardize the
relationship by seeking other sources ofaid.50
It is, ofcourse, possible that Reis had difficulty obtaining financing for his
inventions because they were not thought to be very valuable, but other inven-
tors whose ideas had proven worth experienced similar difficulties.5I A good
illustration is Charles J. Van Depoele, developer of electrical motive systems
for trolleys. Van Depoele was perennially short of the capital he needed to
commercialize his inventions, and he repeatedly signed away his rights for
what appear in retrospect to be paltry sums. In 1880, for example, he assigned
the Canadian patents for all his inventions and any additional ones he would
devise over the next thirty years to one Reuben G. Lunt, in exchange for a cash
50. "Record ofElias E. Reis;' 26-30, 52, Thomson v. Reis, case 13,971, box 1,845, Interference
Case Files, 1836-1905.
51. Moreover, the infringement suit between Reis and Elihu Thomson shows that Reis's ideas
were similar to those developed and exploited commercially by Thomson. See "Testimony on
BehalfofElihu Thomson," case 13,418, box 1,845, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905.51 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
payment of$5,000 (much ofit conditional on the success ofLunt's enterprise).
When the cash was not forthcoming, he was forced to take 10 percent of the
company's stock as payment. Earlier that same year he tried to form a joint-
stock company capitalized at $100,000 to exploit his American patents. The
agreement allocated $70,000 of the stock to George N. Chase "for Services
rendered in organizing SaidCompany & to be sold for Working Capital." The
aim ofthis manipulation was to acquire a working capital ofa mere $10,000.
Whether this company ever got off the ground is not clear, but in 1885 Van
Depoele formed a partnership with William A. Stiles and Albert L. Sweet, to
each of whom he assigned a one-third interest in his inventions. The partner-
ship's capital consisted of little more than his patents, though Sweet was to
advance the firm $1,000 to get the business started. Finally, in 1888 Van De-
poele gave up trying to exploit his inventions himself and took a job with the
Thomson-Houston Electric Company, the predecessor ofGeneral Electric, ac-
cepting in exchange for assignments ofhis past and future inventions a salary
of $5,000 a year, plus a royalty of $5 for every railroad car the company
equipped with electrical motive power during the life ofhis patents. Thomson-
Houston had the capital and access to financing that Van Depoele was unable
to obtain on his own, despite the undoubted value ofhis patents.52
Few inventors, of course, were able to obtain such lucrative contracts, and
as a result few were willing to agree, as Van Depoele did, to assign all past and
future inventions to the company. When the Edison Machine Works' manager
complained in 1890 that employees were refusing to turn over their patents to
the firm, the company's lawyers hadresponded that the solution was to iJ)stitute
contracts requiring employees to make such assignments as a matterofcourse.
The lawyers hastened to add, however, "We fear our suggestion is somewhat
impracticable" (Wise 1985,71). It is likely that the problem they had in mind
was resistance by employees. That at least is the implication as well ofa 1908
book on patents written by Edwin J. Prindle and published by Engineering
Magazine, one of the earliest trade journals to address managers' concerns.
Concluding a chapter, "The Patent Relations of Employer and Employee;'
Prindle urged manufacturers to follow the example ofsome leading firms and
require that "every employee who is at all likely to make inventions" sign con-
tracts providing for the assignmentofpatents to the company. Prindle admitted
52. Articles of agreement between Charles Joseph Van Depoele, Electrician, and Albert Wahl,
both of Detroit, and Reuben Greenliff Lunt of Toronto, 27 November 1880; agreement dated 4
March 1880; agreement between Charles J. Van Depoele, William A. Stiles, and Albert L. Sweet,
6 June 1885; agreement between Charles J. Van Depoele and the Thomson-Houston Electric Co.,
1888; all in folder labeled "Business Papers-Agreements, etc. 1877-89," Charles J. Van Depoele,
1877-92, MSS 867, Unbound Papers, BakerLibrary, Harvard University Graduate School ofBusi-
ness Administration. The folder also includes several other propositions aimed at raising capital,
none of which seem to have been successful. According to W. Bernard Carlson (1991, 216) the
Thomson-Houston Electric Company, as part ofthe deal, acquired the Van Depoele Electric Manu-
facturing Company, which was purchased for its "railway and motor patents."52 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
that it was often difficult to induce employees to sign such agreements, but he
argued that the resistance might be overcome ifofficers set good examples by
binding themselves in the same way (Prindle 1908, 101).
A 1912 letter from a consulting engineer named William Wright to Pull-
man's president, J. S. Runnells, makes a related point in arguing that personnel
issues were at the heart of employee resistance to this type of contract. Ac-
cording to Wright, in "recent years many ofthe large manufacturing industries
in this country have established systems for ... receiving new ideas from em-
ployees." Without such systems in place, employee inventors typically acted on
their own: "Ifone ofthem thinks ofan invention, he is afraid to let it be known
to anyone else because of the danger of his ideas being appropriated, and so
he works them out in secret and sends them to the Patent Office and ifsuccess-
ful in obtaining a patent he generally finds himselfin possession ofsomething
that is impossible for him to handle to advantage, or he disposes ofit to some
outside concern for a consideration."53 Thus, in order to induce employees to
assign their patents to their employers as a matter of course, firms had to as-
suage workers' fears that superiors would steal their ideas. They also had to
develop ways of rewarding employees for their inventions and of convincing
them that these rewards were superior to those that could be earned on the
outside.
Even ifresistance to this type ofemployment contract was overcome, how-
ever, such agreements were really only meaningful ifinventors stayed with the
same firm for an extended period oftime. Otherwise, it would be difficult for
the company to demonstrate that a particular invention was devised during the
patentee's term of employment. H;igh rates of turnover by technologically
knowledgeable people were a significant problem for firms during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even though it was increasingly dif-
ficult for inventors to establish themselves in independent businesses. As the
case of Rollin Abell illustrates, inventors were entrepreneurially oriented and
constantly moved in and out ofemployment positions in response to perceived
opportunities and financial exigencies. Abell clearly thought of himself as an
independent inventor, but from time to time he found it desirable to seek em-
ployment within firms. In 1899 he worked for the General Electric Company
in Lynn, Massachusetts, but he left the firm in order to go into a partnership
with a Dr. Beard to develop a "coaster break" he had invented. A year later he
opened his own office in Boston "to make drawings and design machinery."
Apparently, this business was not successful enough to pay the office rent, and
after attempting to continue it out ofhis home, he gave up and took a job with
the Sub-Marine Signal Company ofBoston. After, a short stint at that firm, he
testified, "[I] resumed working for myself on patent drawings and designing
53. William Wright to J. S. Runnells, 21 October 1912, Operating Department, ChiefEngineer,
Equipment Standards and Testing Records, 1889-1956, box 3, folder 21, Pullman Company Ar-
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machinery," spending several months in 1903 developing a carpet 100m in
Worcester, Massachusetts. A couple ofyears earlier, he had met some business-
men at an automobile show in New York who were interested in steam ve-
hicles. Subsequent conversations led in 1903 to his employment by a Mr.
Newcomb to design a steam touring car in New Jersey. Later that same year
he was in Boston, again desig~ing a car for someone named Barlow. The task
completed, he returned to the "business of making drawings and designing
machinery as before," and there our knowledge ofhim ends.54 The Patent Of-
fice's interference records contain a wealth ofexamples ofinventors with simi-
larly high turnover rates. To give a few examples, William E. Forster, an inven-
tor of sole-leveling machines for the shoe industry, worked for at least five
different firms between 1887 and 1894; Arthur F. Randall, an inventor ofsteam
motor vehicles, worked independently and for at least three firms (including a
patent solicitor) between 1897 and 1899; and William W. Wilson, an inventor
of adding machines, worked for five different companies in that industry be-
tween 1901 and 1906.
55
We can get a more comprehensive idea of what firms were up against by
returning to the subsample ofB patentees whom we were able to track through
city directories. The reader will recall that, compared to the full B sample, the
smaller data set is biased toward patentees with stable careers. Even so, if we
focus on the most productive of these patentees (the fifty-one inventors who
had at leastten patents for which we were able to find corresponding city direc-
tory entries), we find that only seven (14 percent) finished their careers in
stable employment positions. By contrast, twenty-eight (55 percent) ended up
as long-time principals in businesses. The rest either bounced around from one
category to another, or could not readily be classified as either employees or
principals. The implication is that productive inventors preferred to end their
careers as independent proprietors. If they could not achieve this goal, then
they often continued to move restlessly from position to position.
As both the anecdotal and the quantitative evidence suggests, before firms
could reap the fruits that might be obtained from internalizing the process of
invention, they had to learn to solve a number of important personnel prob-
lems. In particular, they had to reduce both employee turnover and inventors'
resistance to signing over the fruits oftheir creativity to their employers. That
is, they had to learn how to convince inventors, who had long regarded inde-
pendent entrepreneurship as the key to upward mobility, that steady employ-
ment offered both rewards and opportunities for advancement. In addition,
firms had to learn how to tighten up their managerial hierarchies so that they
54. Deposition of Rollin Abell, "Testimony on Behalf of Randall & Bates," 78-82, Lemp v.
Randall & Bates, case 24,587, PF box 3,309, ROPO Interference Case Files, 1900-1925.
55. "Preliminary Statement and Record in Behalf of William E. Forster," 1-2, 65, Forster v.
Judd, case 16,542, box 2,279, Interference Case Files, 1836-1905; "Testimony on BehalfofRan-
dall & Bates," 4, 31, 33; "Wilson's Record," 5-7, Putnam v. Wilson, case 27,129, PF box 3,255,
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could credibly guarantee inventors that no one else in the firm would steal
their ideas.56
Although it is beyond the scope ofthis essay to describe the mannerin which
these tasks were accomplished, we conclude this discussion by emphasizing
bow much learning had to bedone. In order, for example, to overcome employ-
ees' resistance and reduce the negative effect that the requirement to assign
patents might have on their incentive to invent, firms typically offered employ-
ees monetary rewards for inventions that led to patents. Such bonuses, how-
ever, could themselves be a source of difficulty. As one of Western Electric's
executives later testified, such a system "put a tremendous incentive" on em-
ployees to work "at counterpoints to their own associates," creating a situation
where "men would not work with each other, they would not confide with each
other, yet the problem which was before us was a problem which required team
action." Even worse, bonuses encouraged employees to "work for themselves
at the expense oftheir employer."
The incentive was to get out as many patents that would pass the Patent
Office as possible. An invention was made. It couldbecovered by one strong
patent or it could be covered by a dozen minor patents. It was to the com-
pany's advantage to have it one strong patent, but it was to the employee's
advantage to have a dozen minor patents, because he profited in a monetary
sense.... Then, in addition to that, it is only a small fraction of the things
which are done in a research and development laboratory that come within
the purview of the patent law. It is only those things which are new and
novel, and which have not been practiced before, which come within the
things which the law says can be patented.57
In order to encourage its employees to work together, to build cases for
single strong patents rather than multiple weak ones, and to work assiduously
on problems that were not likely to lead to patentable solutions (problems that,
as Steven Usselman tells us in chapter 2 in this volume, were an increasingly
important partofthe work oflarge firms), Western Electric, its parent company
AT&T, General Electric, and similarfirms stopped awarding theirresearch em-
ployees bonuses for patents. Instead, employees in the relevant departments
received straight salaries by way ofcompensation. Patents became only one of
the factors that was taken into account in promotion decisions, and firms now
faced new difficulties both in measuring the output oftheir research employees
and creating credible incentives to encourage their productivity.58
56. This process paralleled in important ways the more general learning about how to manage
large numbers of employees that became embodied in personnel departments during the early
twentieth century. See, for example, Jacoby (1985).
57. Testimony ofDr. Frank Baldwin Jewett, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Patents, part 1, 276-77.
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1.7 Conclusions
Recent scholarly literature explains the spread ofin-house research labora-
tories during the early twentieth century by pointing to the information prob-
lems involved in contracting for technology. We have argued, by contrast, that
these difficulties have been 0veremphasized-thatin fact a substantial trade in
patented inventions did develop over the course of the nineteenth century,
much of it taking the form of transactions conducted at arm's length through
the market. In the middle ofthe century, assignments ofpatent rights tended to
occur after the patent was issued and were often partial in character, restricted
to some (perhaps distant) geographic subdivision ofthe United States. As the
century progressed, however, it became increasingly common for patentees to
sell full national rights to their inventions and to dispose ofthese rights more
and more quickly-often by the time the patent was officially issued. These
trends cannot be accounted for by the movement of inventors within firms or
by the growing tendency of employee inventors to assign their patents to the
firms for which they worked. Rather the changes seem to have resulted from
improvements in the efficiency ofthe market for technology-from increases
in the flow and quality ofinformation about new technological developments,
from a growth in the number ofpatent agents and solicitors willing to serve as
intermediaries in this market, and from firms' own investments in the capacity
to track technological developments around the country. As we have seen, en-
terprises as diverse as the American Bell Telephone Company and the Lowell
Machine Shop put great stock during this period in their ability to evaluate
externally generated inventions.
Toward the endofthe century, however, the nature ofthe marketfor technol-
ogy began to change as the proportion ofapparently arm's-length transactions
declined in favor ofassignments made at issue by patentees who were formally
associated with their assignees in some way.59 Although this change may have
betokened a reintegration ofinventive and developmental activities within the
firm, possibly driven by the kind of information problems discussed in the
recent literature, this interpretation is by no means certain. In the first place,
the change was largely accounted for by the increasing tendency of inventors
who were principals in companies to assign their inventions to their firms. In
the second, it is possible that the growing number ofpatentees who behaved in
this manner were forming companies mainly to facilitate their specialization
in invention. Once again, the one thing we can say with some certainty is that
the pattern was not accounted for by the rising tendency ofemployees to assign
theirinventions to theiremployers. Although the proportion ofemployee inven-
59. Although the relationship is unclear, it is interesting to note that the beginning ofthis change
in the market for technology coincided with the beginning ofa long-term decline in rates ofpatent-
ing per capita. This latter development occurred first in geographic areas, like New England, that
were long-time leaders in invention, and then spread to the national level (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff
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tors who transferred patent rights to their companies increased after 1890, the
numbers of these patentees were still too small to account for the aggregate
patterns.
Moreover, when large firms began during the early twentieth century to in-
vest in developing their internal inventive capabilities, they faced a number of
significant difficulties. Most important, they had to insure that they obtained
property rights to inventions conceived on company time with company re-
sources. The solution to this problem was to require employees to sign con-
tracts that obligated them to assign their patents to the firm. Before such con-
tracts could become routine, however, a number of nontrivial difficulties had
to be resolved. Firms had to overcome employee resistance, and they had to
reduce the high turnover rates that made such requirements effectively unen-
forceable. In other words, entrepreneurially oriented inventors had to be con-
vinced that loyal service to a firm offered a combination ofsecurity and oppor-
tunities for advancement superiorto that likely to come from self-employment.
The increased costs of inventive activity and the resulting greater risks borne
by independent inventors by the early twentieth century helped firms to make
their case. But there was still a lot of learning involved. Hence, in important
ways, the story we tell for the early twentieth century turns the recent literature
on its head. Economic actors at that time had a great deal of experience con-
tracting for new technological ideas in the market; what they did not know,
and had to spend a great deal oftime and energy learning, was how to manage
creative individuals within the firm.
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Comment Adam B. Jaffe
This paper provides a fascinating statistical snapshot of invention during the
early phases of the transition to organized industrial research from the era of
individual invention and entrepreneurship. It demonstrates that, at the tum of
Adam B. Jaffe is professor ofeconomics at Brandeis University and a research associate ofthe
National Bureau ofEconomic Research.58 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
the century, there was an active market in apparently arm's-length sales of in-
ventions from individual inventors to firms who were not the inventor's em-
ployer, apparently commonly including inventors employed by one firm selling
patents to another firm. Further, this technology market was economically sig-
nificant, representing both a significant source of new technology for major
firms and a significant destination for the patents of important inventors. This
picture raises a number ofinteresting issues for ourunderstanding ofthe nature
ofthe invention process and its relationship to organizations.
The long period of time after the emergence of large industrial enterprises
during which employees were not typically contractually bound to assign their
inventions to their employers demonstrates the danger ofthe practice, common
among organizational theorists, of assuming that observed organizational
forms must be optimal. Despite the incentive problems that exist when an em-
ployee's ideas become the property of her employer, it cannot be optimal to
pay someone full-time, and provide them with equipment on which to experi-
ment, while permitting them to retain residual rights in inventions developed
on company time and equipment. Further, it does not appear that lack of
knowledge or specific legal impediment prevented the adoption of the more
efficient employment contracts, as some firms did adopt this policy, and no
apparent change in the law occurred before the practice eventually became
widespread. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff's evidence suggests that strong organi-
zational inertia was at work. Companies found it difficult to institute the policy
unilaterally; what is less clear from the paper is why they were unwilling to
compensate employees sufficiently to induce them to accept what was surely
a potentially Pareto-improving regime change. In any event, this story confirms
the applicability to the organizational realm ofKeynes's observation about the
elapsed time before we see "long-run" equilibrium.
The implications for current thinking about technology and organizations of
the finding ofa robust technology market are more subtle and, ultimately, less
clear. The authors accurately represent the current conventional wisdom, that
is, that widespread vertical integration between invention and production is
inevitable, because of complementarity among the processes of production,
marketing, and research, and because of difficulties in contracting over
"knowledge" as a commodity. That a robust arm's-length technology market
existed for so long, that it grew rather than shrinking during the initial rise of
large corporations, and that it was heavily relied upon by the most technologi-
cally sophisticated firms ofthe period does seem to call this conventional wis-
dom into question. I will devote the remainder ofthis comment to the discus-
sion of possibilities for reconciliation of the·' paper's evidence with the
conventional view.
One conceptual possibility is that, of the two reasons typically given for
vertical integration (complementarity and contracting difficulties in knowl-
edge), it is really the first that is most important, and such complementarity is59 Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
much more important today than it was at the tumofthe century. Besides being
excessively convenient, this explanation is not compelling. The invention of
the early period was largely mechanical, and focused on the manufacturing
process. It is hard to see how it was a process less complementary with manu-
facturing than today's science-based research.
A second possibility is that interpreting this evidence as contradicting the
optimality ofvertical integration is falling prey to the fallacy ofassuming that
observed organizational forms are optimal. Current theory doesn't say that sell-
ing technology is impossible, just that it is costly. Perhaps the arm's-length
technology market of the early 1900s was a distinctly second-best situation
that persisted only because it took a long time to get the superior form of
vertical integration going. Indeed, since to really make vertical integration pay
firms would have to own their employees' inventions, the inertia that prevented
the more rapid adoption of this innovation also thereby limited the effective-
ness ofintegration and perhaps preserved the vitality ofthe arm's-length mar-
ket. One can visualize a negative feedback loop, in which the vitality of the
arm's-length market makes employees resistant to relinquishing their rights to
their inventions, while employers' inability to control their employees' inven-
tions limits the effectiveness ofintegration and thereby forces them to rely on
the arm's-length market. Seen through this lens, this aspect of the paper pro-
vides further evidence for the slowness with which superior forms take over,
rather than undermining the conventional wisdom about the sources ofsuperi-
ority ofthe integrated form.
Finally, the evidence of the paper regarding the viability of a market for
technology relates only to patented, and hence patentable, inventions. It is well
understood that much ofindustrial technology is not patented and is probably
not patentable. Clearly, the lack of an explicit property right such as a patent
greatly aggravates the difficulty of selling technology at arm's length. Thus
even ifit were true that all currently patentable inventions are easily amenable
to arm's-length trade, itcould still be the case that much ifnot most ofmodem
technology is not amenable. Further, one ofthe reasons for inventions not be-
ing patentable is the difficulty ofreducing them to the kind ofexplicit descrip-
tion necessary for the patent application. Thus technologies that are not patent-
able are likely to be inherently harder to contract on.
It is well known that the "propensity to patent," which can be thought ofas
the ratio ofthe number ofpatent applications to the number ofinventions, has
been falling throughout this century. Thus it is possible that arm's-length trade
was feasible for much or most ofindustrial technology at the tum ofthe cen-
tury, but is infeasible or at least inefficient for most of industrial technology
today.
While the thrust of these comments is that I remain reasonably convinced
that arm's-length purchase ofinventions is today expensive and inefficient for
much ofmodem technology, it is interesting to note that "outsourcing" ofR&D60 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff
is generally believed to be increasing. This takes several forms. Some firms
are relying increasingly on grants and contracts to universities rather than per-
forming relatively "basic" research in-house. Firms also seem increasingly to
acquire access to technology through a variety of alliances with other firms;
these alliances constitute a sort of halfway house between arm's-length pur-
chase and vertical integration. Thus the questions of how efficiently markets
and organizations handle inventions, and ofwhat properties ofdifferent kinds
of technologies affect the relative efficiency of different organizational and
contractual forms, remain open and important. The authors have made a very
interesting and useful contribution to this discussion.